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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (19 Nov 69) FOR OT UT 693266

28 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Transportation Command, Period Ending 31 July 1969

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ROBERT E. LYNCH
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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APO San Francisco 96243

AVCA SGN TC GCPT

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 4th Transportation Command for Period
Ending 31 July 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65)

THRU: Commanding General
US Army Support Command, Saigon
ATTN: AVCA SGN GO
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Commanding General
1st Logistical Command
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Deputy Commanding General
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Commander in Chief
United States Army, Pacific
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TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (ACSFOR)
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

FOR OT UT
693266

Inclosure

**SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 4th Transportation Command for Period
Ending 31 July 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65)**

1. Section 1. Significant Activities

a. Reorganization:

(1) The reorganization of the 4th Transportation Command initiated in February 1969, for the purpose of redistributing command assets to maximize operational efficiency, was successfully concluded on 25 May. This action resulted in a net reduction of more than 750 military spaces, and was accomplished without degrading mission accomplishment capability. The reorganization standardized the command and control elements of the four water terminals subordinate to the 4th Transportation Command. The nucleus, around which each of these terminal headquarters was built, was a Transportation Terminal Battalion, augmented by a TDL to perform these functions peculiar to the operational environment in which these units are required to operate. Units, by type, required to perform assigned missions functions were attached to each terminal headquarters. (See Inclosures 4 - 18)

(2) The 71st Transportation Battalion (Tnl) assumed responsibility for the operation of the US Army Terminal at Newport. The 551st and 368th Terminal Service Companies organized at Level I strength, and assigned to the 71st Transportation Battalion, are each charged with the responsibility of discharging cargo at one deep-draft berth, and supervising contract operations at a second berth. The 372d Terminal Transfer Company supervises contract operations at two LST slips, two LCU ramps, seven barge sites and a RO-RO pier. Additionally, all three of the aforementioned units provide personnel required to supervise and operate an extensive network of warehouses and port staging areas located at this facility.

(3) The 11th Transportation Battalion (Tnl) retained responsibility for operating the US Army Terminal at Cat Lai, and assumed responsibility for operation of the Cogido and Binh Hoa ammunition barge discharge sites, and the Ho Nai railhead. Thus, the ammunition distribution system for the entire III and IV CTZ was placed under the control of this terminal. The 402nd Terminal Transfer Company and the 262d, 264th, and 265th Crane Detachments (Tn JD) were transferred from the 71st Transportation Battalion to the 11th Transportation Battalion in order to provide the latter unit with the assets required to assume this added responsibility. The 124th Terminal Service Company was reorganized by USARP/C GO 403, 20 May 1969, as a Type B unit and is being utilized to supervise contract operations aboard three ammunition ships discharging in the stream simultaneously. Other attached elements include the 1099th Medium Boat Company; the 533th and 592 LHE Detachments (Tn JE); the 536th Maintenance Detachment (Tn JA); and the 259th Floating Craft Maintenance Detachment (Tn IE).

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(4) The 159th Transportation Battalion (Tnl), which is responsible for all operations at the US Army Terminal at Vung Tau, and the sub-ports of Binh Thuy, Vinh Long and Dong Tam in the Mekong Delta, was provided with a 91 man provisional augmentation in lieu of Det 2, TDA to the 4th Transportation Command, and the 34th Heavy Boat Platoon, both of which were drawn down to zero strength. Thus, this unit now consists of: the 5th and 329th Heavy Boat Companies; the 440th Terminal Transfer Company; Detachments 2 and 2A, US Army Marine Maintenance Activity Vietnam (USMMAV); the 140th, 256th and 563d Crane Detachments (TM JB); the 474th, 488th and 492d Reefer Detachments (TM FH); the 634th Tug Detachment (TM FN); and the 504th Reefer Detachment.

(5) The US Army Transportation Battalion Saigon (Prov)(USATBS) was formed and assumed responsibility for the operation of the Saigon Port, replacing the 125th Transportation Command (Tnl A). Detachment 4, TDA to the 4th Transportation Command, formed the nucleus around which this unit was formed. The 154th and the 567th Terminal Service Companies; reorganized as Type B units by USARPAC GO 403, 20 May 1969, were detached from the 71st Transportation Battalion and attached to the USATBS to supervise contract operations at four deep-draft berths under the direct control of this terminal, and berths of opportunity in the commercial port area. The US Army Harborcraft Company (Prov) was formed from 27 separate floating craft detachments, plus assets attained from the 4th Transportation Command TDA. This unit, together with the 58th and 508th APU and Detachment 4, USMMAV, were also attached to the Provisional Battalion.

(6) The augmentation to the three battalions and the provisional units were drawn from the resources of: the 125th Transportation Command (Tnl A); the 34th Heavy Boat Platoon; the 511th and 703d Trans Dets; the TD Augmentation to the 4th Transportation Command (P5WCJ19901); the 355th and 380th Y Tanker Detachments (TM FH); the 472d, 519th, 538th, 539, 626th, and 473d 45' Tug Detachments (TM FG); the 431st and 529th 60 Ton Floating Crane Detachments (TM FK); the 528th 100 Ton Floating Crane Detachment (TM FL); the 556th, 558th, 559th, 267th, 497th, 560th, and 561st Liquid Barge Detachments (TM FD); the 66d, 623d, 275th, and 624th Patrol Boat Detachments (TM FF); the 628th, 630st, 631th, and 629th 55' Tug Detachments (TM FJ); and the 633d 100' Tug Detachment (TM FH).

b. Audits: (1) In March 1969, a USARV Internal Review Team conducted a review of port operations, to include a follow-up review of actions taken on recommendations contained in US Army Audit Agency (USAAA) reports 67-69, 5 May 1967; and 68-4, 30 October 1967. The two principal areas of concern were security and accountability of cargo discharged at command terminals; the review team paid particular attention to determining the extent and adequacy of corrective action taken in these areas. Though relatively minor

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deficiencies were noted, all but those over which this command has no control have been corrected, and actions have been taken to bring the few remaining problems to the attention of higher headquarters for resolution.

(2) Another USARV Internal Review Team simultaneously conducted a review of policies and procedures involving the operations, maintenance and logistical support of Material Handling Equipment (MHE) within the command, and evaluated actions taken on recommendations contained in US Army Agency Report PA 59-17, 10 February 1968, subject: MHE. The audit team noted that a few deficiencies still exist, but major improvement was evident. A comprehensive report has not yet been furnished this command.

(3) On 17 April 1969, The General Accounting Office began an audit review to evaluate action taken on the findings included in the GAO Report to Congress - "Need to Strengthen Control over Incoming USAID Cargo" (B-159451, May 15, 1968), which stressed problems of port congestion, cargo accountability, and port security. The vast majority of these problems no longer exist. It is anticipated that the findings published as a result of this review will reflect that considerable progress has been made, and will, in fact, be favorable to the command.

b. **Advancements:** in the Automated Cargo Management System. During the period May-July 1969 significant progress was made with regard to improvements to and expansion of the Automated Cargo Management System being implemented within the command.

(1) Improvement in content and use of documents.

(a) Preprinted vessel discharge tally: Several format improvements made to facilitate use of the form by terminal personnel and improve the accuracy of item counts.

(b) Consignee summary: Additional and more detailed data added to summary to facilitate CDI activity, and make document more informative to consignees.

(c) Cargo manifest: Several format changes made and sequence changed from consignee within hatch to consignee, to facilitate distribution and use. Until 1 July all import cargo hard copy manifests were supplied by the appropriate POB. As of that date the Cargo Accounting Division is preparing these manifests for all cargo arriving at terminals under the 4th TC jurisdiction.

(d) Vessel Register: Several format improvements made and several additional data elements added, making the register a better management tool for internal Division use in controlling production of discharge and movement documentation.

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(e) Reconciliation reports: More flexibility available to Accounting Branch Chief now in that there is available to him a variety of methods to determine extent of receipt delinquencies and trends within the consignee area. A new monthly printout indicating degree of responsiveness to receipt responsibility by major consignee is now being prepared and furnished to higher headquarters.

(f) Preprinted TCID. The general formatting has been improved by re-positioning certain items and eliminating data not relevant to the purpose for which TCID is intended. In addition, a cross-reference of TCN to TCID serial number is now being furnished terminal commanders in order to expedite the locating of preprinted documents and to verify TCN. Prior to 15 June preprinted TCIDs were being used only at USAT, Newport. At that time the use of these forms was expanded to the Saigon Terminal.

(g) Outturn worksheet. Automation has progressed to the point where we are now able to mechanically compare cargo manifest and discharge data, producing as a result, a worksheet delineating those TCNs for which there is a discrepancy between the two figures. Whereas previously the outturn clerk had to manually compare every discharge tally line item to the manifest, she now is concerned only with the exception data. The use of the machine match has reduced the outturn clerical workload by as much as 75 per cent.

(2) Expansion to export automation. In May 1969, the automated system was expanded to include export manifesting for deep draft vessels departing for COMUS and PACOM POD's. Both hard copy manifests and manifest transceiver cards are produced. Additionally, at USAT Newport, a cargo status report, reflecting retrograde vehicles staged in the terminal area, is now produced daily. Much greater expansion in the export area will be possible if standardization of cargo marking and TCID preparation is achieved in Vietnam, and export cargo data made available to the 4th TC at the time TCIDs are booked with TIL.

c. Cargo Accounting Division Reorganization: By late June 1969, the use of automated accounting procedures within the Cargo Accounting Division had progressed to the point where a major reorganization of the division, oriented toward the ADP system of cargo management, was considered practical. In addition, a further reduction in the number of LI employees was considered feasible at that time. Accordingly, on 7 July 1969, the reorganization and a RIF were effected. Thirty LI employees were released, bringing the total LI reduction since 1 Jan 69 to 69 personnel. The division now functions in principally an ADP environment. Approximately one-third of the remaining 97 LI employees and over one-half of the 53 military assigned are directly engaged in programming, operations, and control aspects of the ADP system.

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d. On 30 June 1969, Colonel John E. Murray assumed command from Colonel Owen J. Walsh. See Incl 19

e. Automation of the IHI Project.

(1) On 10 July 1969, Headquarters, 1st Log requested the 4th TC to program for local computer application a Intensive Management Item (IHI) Report. The report has heretofore been prepared manually by ACoFS, Transportation by extracting data from a cargo manifest listing of major items which was furnished by the ICC. On 26 July 1969, the first automated IHI report prepared by matching shipment list data cards received by transceiver from the US Army Logistics Control Office - Pacific, with a stock number card file of all IHI line items, which was furnished by 1st Log. Advantages of automating this report are:

(a) A reduction in report preparation time from approximately 35 hours a week to two hours.

(b) A more comprehensive IHI report. The manual report, dependent solely on ILSWAP data, included only major items. Shipment list data, supplied by USALCOP, includes secondary items and repair parts.

(c) More meaningful information for management. The report includes elements of both supply and transportation data which will improve the overall effectiveness of logistics management.

2. RO/RO Facility: Command emphasis was placed on constructing a RO/RO facility at Newport. Drawings and plans were made by the terminal engineer for an estimated cost of \$100,000. The additional requirement that work be completed in 30 days by the commander left only military and self-help to fabricate and install this pier. Utilizing two 100' BC barges out of the Barge Pool and a Retro Bridge at Newport, this RO/RO Facility was put in at the LCU ramp using the barge site. Dredging was completed to a depth of 32' and one additional deep draft berth was made available. This pier was completed in five working days. This facility was open and used on 13 June by USMC vessel Sealift.

3. Lashing gear has continued to be a significant problem throughout the quarter. Due to the withdrawal of the 9th Inf Div, an additional retrograde requirement has taxed our already slim resources. A command letter initiated 5 May 1969 has brought a firm commitment by the USMACV to provide the drastically needed stocks. Starting in June, clamps and shackles have been airlifted into Tan Son Nhut Air Base where USAT, Newport has been making unit pick up. The ACoFS, G4 has further redistributed assets to other terminals as required. Wire rope, still critically short, has thus far not been received. A review of incoming TQIDs revealed that 5/8" clamps were erroneously recorded as wire rope. Follow-up has been made with ACoFS, Transportation, CSC.

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h. The 231st Trans Co (IB) is being prepared for turnover to the ARVN on 15 August 1969. In addition to providing items for filling the ARVN TOE, complete Prescribed Load Lists and Basic Issue Items Lists equipment are required to be on hand. Much of this equipment prior to "PROJECT SWITCH" was not on hand or on requisition. By hand carrying releases to Long Binh, Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay Depots the 231st has been filling its PML & BIL TOE equipment not previously on hand has been provided. Distinct problems encountered have been the excessive number of project officers involved. In one day the 231st could expect to be called by USARV, 1st Log or MACV, each with different information. The actual date of turnover has fluctuated between two week period and no command has been able to make a firm decision on actual turnover. Lessons Learned now with Project Switch 231st should prove advantageous in planning future turnovers.

i. In order to effectively control and lower the MHE deadline rate within the acceptable MACV tolerance, several programs have been initiated within the command

(1) With the cooperation of our direct support maintenance activity, forklifts are being inspected and classified on-site as "XCS". This has resulted in saving valuable maintenance manhours that would have been required to prepare the equipment for field maintenance. Along this same line, the importance of turning-in equipment to field maintenance within three days is being emphasized and closely monitored.

(2) Informal and formal on-site instruction on cranes and forklifts is being provided by a IECOM field technician to improve our unit's material readiness posture. Classes in proper operation, operator maintenance, proper performance of scheduled maintenance services, and trouble shooting equipment failures are being conducted on the rough terrain crane and forklift. Classes of this nature have been conducted in the Delta, in Newport, and at Cat Lai and will continue throughout the command.

(3) Periodic spot checks are made to insure that parts required for declassified equipment are on Red Ball requisition, and timely follow-up action is being accomplished.

j. The completion of the project for rehabilitation of the Cat Lai Anchorage System on 11 July 1969 has enabled the ammunition discharge mission in support of III and IV Corps Tactical Zones to be responsive to the number of deep draft vessels arriving for discharge and likewise has provided the Cat Lai area with adequate barge mooring facilities. Prior to the accomplishment of the project, only two deep draft moorings were available and a third was unusable due to damage. Also, there were only three barge buoys. The new system has provided four deep draft moorings and five barge mooring buoys at a total cost of \$1,533,000.00. One mooring is unusable. Further details in next report.

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h. For some time the ability to obtain desired cargo handling rates at the Delta ports of Binh Thuy, Dong Tam, and Vinh Long has been lacking due to inadequate equipment. Based upon an operational study conducted by this headquarters, the following levels of ME were established and provided each site. Overall, a total of sixteen items was laterally transferred to the Delta. Break down of equipment follows:

<u>SITES</u>	<u>F/L RT</u> <u>5,000 lbs</u>	<u>F/L RT</u> <u>10,000 lbs</u>	<u>CRANES</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
Binh Thuy	7** (4)	3* (0)	2 (1)	12 (5)
Vinh Long	5 (1)	2 (1)	2 (1)	9 (3)
Dong Tam	6** (5)	2 (10)	2 (2)	10 (7)
Total	18 (10)	7 (11)	6 (4)	31 (15)

() indicated previous density of equipment.

* include one 15,000 lb CIL F/L

** include one 5,000 lb CIL F/L

1. To effectively lower the deadline rate for tug boats within the acceptable MACV tolerance level several programs have been initiated within the command:

(1) Technical inspections have received increased emphasis, especially at the command levels, thus placing interest and priorities on the proper and expeditious repair of these critical assets.

(2) Technical assistance visits have been increased in scope and frequency to aid units in troubleshooting maintenance problem areas and insure short down-times when a tug becomes non-operational.

(3) Maintenance management has been effectively increased at this level with the use of many previously unused management tools. This has enabled the shifting of vital resources, of both repair parts and trained personnel, to trouble spots through coordinations by this office. These programs will remain in effect to keep the tugboat deadline rate within acceptable level.

m. During the quarter all harborcraft units operating galleys converted to monetary ration allowance system. Based upon the experience gained during the trial operation of the system, by the Provisional Harbor Craft Company, the 159th Transportation Battalion commenced operations under this rationing system on 1 July 1969. This action places all vessel galleys on a single system and will simplify accounting procedures and result in greater savings. See Report of 30 April 1969.

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n. The Information Office began production on 23 July 1969 of the 4th TC World-News Roundup, a daily news bulletin giving the highlights of the day in capsule form. At present, distribution is made to Camp Davies, Newport and Cat Lai. Distribution to the 159th is scheduled for the future.

o. Supplies made available to Saigon's District 4 were delivered in June during a ceremony at the District Chief's home. Twenty-five families received roofing tin and cement for repair of their homes. This is a continuing project whereby the district chief inspects the project and provides the 4th TC CA officer with a list of materials required.

p. As of 31 July 1969 the 4th Transportation Command is at 89 per cent of its authorized strength. This represents 77 per cent of authorized officers, 95 per cent of authorized Warrant Officers, and 89 per cent of its authorized enlisted personnel. Listed below are specific figures:

(1) MILITARY ASSIGNED	AUTHORIZED				ACTUAL			
	O	W	E	T	O	W	E	T
HHC, 4th TC	69	4	183	256	59	5	218	282
USATBS(P)	36	43	431	530	24	32	418	474
71st Trans Bn	39	5	1002	1046	29	2	643	674
11th Trans Bn	26	3	595	624	20	1	584	605
159th Trans Bn	41	56	974	1071	30	63	1020	1113
USA Camp Davies	5	0	79	84	5	0	70	75
Total	<u>215</u>	<u>111</u>	<u>3314</u>	<u>3641</u>	<u>167</u>	<u>103</u>	<u>2953</u>	<u>3223</u>
(2) MILITARY ATTACHED								
402nd Trans Det	5	0	43	48	5	0	33	43
50th APU	1	0	12	13	1	0	18	19
508th APU	1	0	15	16	1	0	35	36
11XV Det 4	0	1	37	38	0	3	53	56
11XV Det 2 & 2A	1	1	158	160	1	2	135	138
Total	<u>8</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>265</u>	<u>275</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>279</u>	<u>292</u>
(3) Grand Total	<u>224</u>	<u>113</u>	<u>3579</u>	<u>3916</u>	<u>175</u>	<u>108</u>	<u>3232</u>	<u>3513</u>

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q. Civilian Personnel: The current number of civilian personnel authorized and employed is as follows:

- (1) DA Civilians:**
 - (a) Authorized: 1**
 - (b) Recruiting Authority: 2**
 - (c) Assigned: 1**
- (2) Local Nationals:**
 - (a) Authorized: 1743**
 - (b) Assigned: 1359**

r. Safety: During this reporting period the 4th TC safety program reflected a rise in the number of recordable motor vehicle accidents and personnel injuries. The last month, July 1969, really wrecked a fine performance as there were three recordable motor vehicle accidents and three recordable personnel injuries during this month. Overall there were four recordable motor vehicle accidents and seven personnel injuries as compared to four and twelve respectively for the last period ending April 1969.

e. Hospitalization: During the period there were 75 individuals hospitalized as compared to 84 during the last period. Considering the increase in assigned personnel, this is a significant improvement. Research of reasons reveals no significant area responsible for hospitalization. The trend has been coming down to the point that only 11 persons were hospitalized during July 1969.

t. AWOL: A continuing problem of major significance to this command is the high AWOL rate. While the total number of 55 is a significant drop from the 79 reported during the last period it is still considered too high. Steps are being made to follow up on these cases to establish information on the individuals going AWOL, i.e. reason stated by EII, his job performance, background of the individual, etc. The area uncovered so far indicates that:

- (1) 50 per cent of the AWOLs are delayed returns from authorized absences, i.e. R&R and Leave.**
- (2) Enlisted personnel seeking solution to obtaining marriage to local nationals.**
- (3) Some units picking a man up as AWOL for failure to repair.**

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u. Reenlistment: Our program continues to improve but not to the level it should be. Maximum command emphasis is being placed upon this vital program, i.e. refurnishing career counselors offices, providing transportation, making personnel available at any time, full-time counselors, publicity at every unit level, etc. The results in the two most important categories are as follows:

1. 1st Term RA - There were 12 enlisted from 55 eligibles (22%) as compared to 5 enlisted from 35 eligibles (14%) last reporting period.

2. AUS - There were 2 enlisted from among 53 eligible (4%) as compared to 1 enlisted from 31 eligibles (3%) last reporting period.

v. The LN civilian overtime rates continue to receive attention by this command. The decline in overtime, as a result of converted command emphasis, has leveled off during this reporting period. As of the end of the last reporting period ending in April 1969 the average overtime per LN Employee was 40 hours per two week pay period. As of the end of this reporting period the average overtime rate per two-week pay period was 38 hours, a significant reduction of ten hours per employee.

w. R&R: This command has not been utilizing its R&R quotas effectively. Overall during this period, the percentage of utilization has dropped from 89% (last period) to 86% for this reporting period. Not only has there been a significant drop in utilization, but there has also been a large number of personnel failing to show up for their scheduled R&R Flights. A complete shake-up in the administration of this program to include positive command controls has been instituted to make an immediate improvement in freeing personnel to go on R&R and then insure they do go when scheduled.

x. Extension of Foreign Service Tours: There were 334 individuals who extended their FST during this reporting period as compared to 242 during the past reporting period. This represents a change from 2.7% (last period) to 3.6% for this period.

y. During the reporting period ending 31 July 1969, the following terminals of the 4th Transportation Command experienced the following turnaround data:

(1) Saigon Terminal:

(a) 89 vessels worked.

(b) 0.8 average number of days waiting.

(c) 3.9 average number of days on berth.

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(2) Newport Terminal:

- (a) 83 vessels worked.**
- (b) 0.7 average number of days waiting.**
- (c) 3.4 average number of days on berth.**

(3) Cat Lai Terminal:

- (a) 34 vessels worked.**
- (b) 1.7 average number of days waiting.**
- (c) 8.3 average number of days on berth.**
- (d) 1.4 average number of days in hold.**

z. During the same reporting period, the Saigon Terminal discharged 18 refrigerated cargo vessels with an average of 4.1 days on berth. The 159th Trans Bn at Vung Tau discharged 17 refrigerated cargo vessels with an average of 2.7 days on berth.

aa. During this reporting period, the turning basin at Newport was dredged and enlarged to a 700' foot diameter with 10 meters of water. Previously, vessels over 510' were unable to use the turning basin and, as a result, unable to dock at Newport. This presented several problems, the major one being the movement of retrograde cargo from the staging areas in Long Binh to the port of Saigon. However, with the enlarged turning basin, a ship cleared for a retrograde backload can either be docked directly at Newport or shifted to Newport from Saigon when discharged. This situation speeds up the backloading of retrograde cargo and frees the many barges and trucks used for movement of retrograde cargo to Saigon for the many other jobs required of them.

bb. During the reporting period, a "Roll On/Roll Off" ramp was constructed at the Newport barge site. Previously, the berth at K10 in the commercial Saigon Port was the only RO/RO facility in the port complex. This situation required the movement of RO/RO trailers and other general cargo through the crowded streets of Saigon to and from the staging areas in Long Binh. With the addition of the RO/RO ramp and a staging yard at Newport, the problem of lack of pier space has been eliminated, whereas at K10 the problem was critical. Trailers had to be called forward just before loading to prevent overcrowding the pier, but now an entire shipload of trailers can be staged at Newport and be loaded in a continuous flow, with an increase in cargo loaded and a decrease in time on berth.

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cc. Provost Marshal Activities:

(1) A project was undertaken to replace the existing USARV Contractors' Passes (USARV Form 362) presently being utilized in the command for the identification and control of Direct Hire stevedores. New passes were obtained and the present color coding system for each port changed to prevent the unauthorized use of previously lost or stolen passes. This change will make it possible for Security Guard personnel to immediately recognize individuals authorized access to a certain area and assist in their control. This project was delayed beyond the early July issue date because of availability of clips. Clips were secured and the project will be completed in early August.

(2) Several messages have been received from higher headquarters indicating the continuing emphasis on control of individual and unauthorized weapons and ammunition. This emphasis has brought about a marked reduction in the number of accidents and incidents involving weapons in the command. As part of a continuing campaign in this area, directives have been published and distributed for the guidance of all subordinate units. It is expected that adherence to the guidance furnished and continued command emphasis, using unannounced shake down inspections, serial number inventories, and spot checks, will achieve the desired result of eliminating incidents involving misuse of weapons.

(3) A sentry dog team was used to good advantage in the western portion (USATBS Dunnage Yard and Philco Ford CCVEW Area) of Camp Davies to stop unauthorized entry of Local Nationals. The sentry dog team was utilized during the hours of darkness to strengthen the security of the vulnerable area. Bi-lingual signs were posted warning of sentry dogs patrolling the area. These dogs have been a great actual and psychological deterrent to would-be thieves in the area.

(4) Two meetings were held during this period in reference to freeflow of vehicles and operation "overtake". Units represented at these meetings were: 39th LP Group and subordinate battalions, Long Binh Post Provost Marshall, 4th Trans Comd, USATBS, 71st Trans Bn, 48th Group (IT), 3d Trans Region (TIA), Movements Control, Philco Ford INC., Army Depot Long Binh, and PACEX B&B Depot. The primary objective was to discuss the "freeflow" of cargo vehicles during the hours of darkness between USAT Newport and Long Binh Post and other mutual problems in cargo movement. It was determined that VN drivers could not drive Philco Ford vehicles after curfew hours unless they were escorted by US military personnel, therefore freeflow for Philco Ford trucks is precluded. The CO, 48th Trans Group (IT) requested that vehicles with US military drivers be permitted to proceed without escort. This request was forwarded to 1st Log Command where it was disapproved. All vehicles are being escorted. At the present time these escorts are being performed smoothly by the 39th LP Group with no apparent problems.

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(5) The new 4th Trans Comd Regulation 335-2, Serious Incident Report and 4th TC Reg 190-5 (C), Security Against Underwater Swimmer Attacks were published during this period. These new regulations supplement and further clarify procedures outlined in directives issued by higher headquarters.

(6) The Deputy Provost Marshal and Physical Security Officer departed this command on normal DEROS in early July. As of the end of this period, no replacements have been received nor are any programmed by name. At the present time the PII is the only officer assigned to this staff section. The shortages of qualified replacements has reduced the frequency of staff visits and inspections and will have a definite adverse effect on the accomplishments of the assigned mission should replacements not be received soon.

(7) During the period 4 May - 12 July 1969, this office received 204 TCID's where consignee denied receipt of cargo for investigation. Of this total 182 have been investigated. As a result of the completed investigations, it was revealed that in 176 cases cargo had been received, but not properly recorded by the consignee. In each of the 176 cases where the cargo had been received, investigation established this fact through checks of gate logs, property books, stock record cards and physical inventory of storage yards. It is clearly evident in each of these cases that the consignee is not checking his records properly prior to returning TCID's to the Cargo Accounting Division denying receipt. The remaining 6 cases, although receipt was not conclusively established did provide sufficient indication that cargo reasonably arrived at consignee and is not missing but faulty records preclude a positive response. This failure on the part of the consignee is placing undue strain on Cargo Accounting Division and on the Provost Marshal Investigation Section. CAD is obtaining data for preparation of a report identifying consignees failing to return TCID's, number of TCID's not reconciled during a 30 day period, this by 5, 10, 20 and 30 days periods, and number of TCID's forwarded for investigation. Efforts will continue by both PII office and CAD to reduce the number of improperly denied TCID's by consignees.

dd. (1) The 4th Transportation Command ARVNization Program continued to expand during the reporting period. Master, Chief Engineer, and Marine Maintenance trainees who started OJT at Vung Tau in April completed their training on 15 July 1969. The trainees were given practical exercises and performance tests which required satisfactory completion. A total of 21 trainees graduated at Vung Tau.

(2) Twenty-eight new trainees began their 90-day OJT Program at Vung Tau on 25 July 1969. They will receive the same training as the first group of ARVN trainees.

(3) The ten tug boat master trainees at Saigon were to have completed their training on 1 July 1969. It was determined that additional time was needed for proper training; a sixty day extension was given by Transportation

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Advisory Division. These tug boat trainees will now graduate on 29 August 1969, after completion of practical exercises and performance tests.

(4) A Crane Operations OJT program began on 15 July 1969 on the 100-T Floating Crane, BD 501. One warrant officer and two NCO's started a 90-day training course.

(5) Two ARVN Captains began OJT programs in G-3 Operations on 28 July 1969. One is training with Operations Section; the other is training with the Harbormaster office.

(6) Projected programs include LCU Crew Training, riggers, and more Marine Maintenance personnel. Unit training in Heavy Boat Operations is in the planning stages.

2. Section 2: Lessons Learned: Commanders' Observation, Evaluation and Recommendations.

a. Personnel:

(1) **ITEM:** Comparison of Disciplinary Problems with regard to "Project 100,000" Personnel.

(a) **OBSERVATION:** "Project 100,000" personnel do not create a disproportionate share of disciplinary problems when compared with strengths.

(b) **EVALUATION:** A study was conducted of 318 "Project 100,000" personnel representing 11.2 % of this command's strength. Study was to determine if these personnel were causing a larger share of disciplinary problems than others. Results of this study show no correlation between strengths and disciplinary rates (See Inclosure 20). There are several factors, that cannot be measured, which tend to influence the disciplinary rate for the "Project 100,000" personnel. Among these are: location of unit, facilities available; level of skill required; job responsibilities, and attitude of commanders towards using Article 15 versus court-martial. For example, 71st Transportation Battalion utilizes "Project 100,000" personnel as stevedores and cargo handlers, and though that unit has the largest concentration of these personnel, they have a relatively lower court-martial rate. In Headquarters Company and Camp Davies where skills and job responsibilities are more demanding, the disciplinary rate for "Project 100,000" personnel was the highest. (See Incl 20).

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That "Project 100,000" personnel be distributed equitably within commands and that they be utilized in positions commensurate with their ability.

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(2) ITEM: The shortage of Security Guard personnel in units supporting this command continues to be a problem.

(a) OBSERVATION: The 92nd Military Police Battalion, which provides direct support to this command for port security, has advised this office of shortages existing in the battalion, specifically in Security Guard personnel, LOS 11B, which will affect its ability to provide sufficient personnel to meet requirements. Response to a command letter forwarded to 1st Log Command on this subject indicated fill would occur in June, however this fill did not materialize. At this point the shortage of security guard personnel presents some problems, however, the shortage has been made up by use of operational personnel from port operating units. Continual shortages can have adverse effects on physical security.

(b) RECOMMENDATION: That military police units, specifically security guard companies providing direct support to port facilities be maintained at a strength level sufficient to meet the security personnel requirements existing in port installations.

(3) ITEM: Input of Replacement Personnel:

(a) OBSERVATION: Mission accomplishment requires maximum utilization of available skills.

(b) EVALUATION: During the period, a large number of individual replacements arrived in the Command. Due to the reassignment of 9th Infantry Division personnel, although they represented a surplus in Marine LOSs, many possessed other skills that were more critical to the needs of the command. Under the Personnel Service Center procedures presently in effect, the replacements arrive without records. The records are retained by the PSC at Dien Hoa. The Command is therefore denied access to information regarding additional skills, both military and civilian acquired. This was obtained through interview and personnel were assigned accordingly. Obtaining the information through interview is a time-consuming process and places a workload on commands with a reduced number of administrative personnel.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Newly assigned personnel in all grades should arrive with personnel records.

(4) ITEM: Non-receipt of orders:

(a) OBSERVATION: Many personnel approaching DEROS have not received assignment instructions or orders.

(b) EVALUATION: Personnel approaching DEROS without assignment instructions or orders are placed at an extreme disadvantage. They are unable

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to ship hold baggage, plan for movement of family and household goods, or make other decisions such as sale or rental of homes. This creates a serious morale problem. As this command does not maintain personnel records, it does not become aware of a case until the Assignment of Oversea Returnee Report (AOR) submitted to Department of the Army is the basis for issuance of instructions. Personnel erroneously omitted from this report will not receive orders. This command is not on distribution for this report, which could be used to insure that all personnel were reported. This could be separated by company and placed on unit bulletin boards for individual verification.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That 4th Trans Comd be furnished a copy of the portion of the AOR report pertaining to personnel assigned to the command.

c. Operations:

(1) ITEM: Port clearance of new vehicles.

(a) **OBSERVATION:** On 10 May 1969, the 4th Transportation Command assumed the mission of port clearance of new vehicles to first consignee destination. The first few weeks of the operation revealed many procedural weaknesses in the operation. Processing of the vehicles by PA&E moved along very well, but onward movement presented a problem. At first the 40th Trans Group established a team of 12 drivers. This proved to be unsatisfactory since the volume of vehicles was too great for them to handle. To supplement, terminal personnel living in areas close to depots were used to drive vehicles to the depot. This also proved unsatisfactory when it was found that those personnel were working from 14 to 17 hours a day. When the backlog became so great that over 1000 vehicles were in port, the terminals started shipping them on beds of Philco-Ford contract trucks. Command policy was published reflecting a 72-hour pick-up time for units to pick up vehicles or they would be considered customer refusal and be shipped to depot. In this way the operation of thru-put was enhanced. Army Depot Long Binh has started a thru-put operation which allows the receiving unit to have a vehicle issued to them from the port, but by no means does this give depot another storage facility.

(b) **EVALUATION:** By aggressive command emphasis on thru-put, terminal operations are improved and the user is able to have a vehicle made available to him within 24 hours after it comes off the ship.

(c) **RECOMMENDATIONS:** 1. That the command policy of 72 hours free time in port be strictly adhered to.

2. That the units and break bulk issuing agencies review their notification procedures to ensure that the correct personnel within the units and break bulk points are receiving information on vehicles in port in the most expeditious manner possible.

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c. Training - None.

d. Intelligence - None.

e. Logistics:

(1) ITEM: Common Unit Supply Deficiencies.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the past quarter a series of supply/liaison inspections to subordinate units revealed the following major weaknesses common to all units.

1. There is a distinct lack of experienced supply personnel in all units. Most enlisted supply personnel are OJT and are working in other than their assigned IDS.

2. Unit supply personnel are clearly not familiar with unit equipment authorizations under TOE/ITOE and do not have current tabular authority available. Consequently, figures submitted on various recurring reports are erratic and inconsistent.

3. Battalion supply and maintenance personnel report different densities for major items of equipment. This indicates a lack of staff coordination and inadequate knowledge of current equipment status within units.

4. IAW AR 735-35, equipment authorized by TOE/ITOE must be on hand or on requisition. The majority of units have equipment that is authorized but not on requisition or on hand. Other units have more equipment on requisition than is authorized.

5. Hand receipt holders are not clearing their hand receipts prior to DEROS. Accountability is subsequently lost, necessitating numerous time-consuming reports of survey.

(b) EVALUATION: Numerous minor problems have been resolved through advice rendered on the supply inspection/liaison visits. A requirement exists for subordinate units to carefully screen personnel to insure qualification prior to assignment in supply, and not to use available personnel simply for the sake of expediency. Valid authorization documents must be obtained that are current for each different TOE unit. Supply personnel must insure familiarization with these documents. Tighter control must be exercised by all commanders to insure proper accountability of all equipment and to insure that all hand receipts are already cleared prior to DEROS of personnel. Also requisitions for major items of equipment should be screened to insure compliance with tabular authority.

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Ending 31 July 1969 (RCS CSFOL-35)

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That personnel scheduled for assignment to supply functions in RVN attend formal training courses prior to departing CONUS, be selected from active supply organizations, such as depots; receive refresher training at service schools; or be provided OJT of at least three weeks duration prior to departure from home station.

(2) ITEM: Deadline Rate - IHE:

(a) OBSERVATION: The IACV tolerance level for deadline IHE is 20%. In April the command rate was 26%. Due to the implementation of better maintenance management tools, this rate declined to 21% in May and 17% in June, with the rate for July forecast to remain well below the 20% level. This success in lowering the non-availability rate can be attributed to:

1. New impetus on "Project DOG" to eliminate worn-out equipment. During the report, 59 pieces of equipment were turned-in as "DOG" with an additional 57 nominated and being processed for retrograde action.
2. Requiring commanders to explain excessive deadline rates. This results in placing command emphasis on maintenance at the individual unit level.
3. Emphasizing direct coordination between 4th Trans Comd units and supporting DSU's to aid in expeditious repair and return of equipment, shorter classification times for "DOG" candidates, and improved availability of repair parts. This is accomplished at each level of command and often through the assistance of Director of Maintenance, SSC.
4. A renovated, vigorous program of maintenance assistance/inspection visits by the Maintenance Assistance Team, this office. This includes instruction on equipment operation and proper maintenance techniques, as well as emphasis on effective maintenance management.
5. Strong command emphasis on maintenance by terminal commander.

(b) EVALUATION: The rigorous use of maintenance management tool that were previously neglected and caused a climbing non-availability rate has effectively lowered the command IHE deadline rate placing it below the IACV tolerance level.

(c) RECOMMENDATION:

1. That continued command emphasis on maintenance be sustained.
2. That attendance of the command maintenance courses conducted by the Armor School at Fort Knox, Kentucky be mandatory for all officers assigned to RVN.


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**(3) ITEM: The Marine Maintenance Blanket Purchase Agreement, monitored
by USAIIIIV Detachment #4, closed for FY 69 in an overobligated status.**

**(a) OBSERVATION: On three different occasions the former ordering
officer overobligated the account. Consequently, contractors were forced
to delay submission of invoices until additional funds could be obtained.**

**(b) EVALUATION: By transferring the accounting functions to a third
party, a continuous and unbiased ledger is being maintained for marine
expenditures.**

**(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the functions of the ordering officer and
requiring agencies under all BPA's be accomplished by different persons.
Under no circumstances should these responsibilities be assigned to the
same individual.**



**JOHN E. MURRAY
COLONEL, TC
Commanding**

20 Incl

as

Incls 1 - 19 wd HQ, DA

AVCA SGN GO S (10 Aug 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 4th Transportation Command (TML C)
for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

HQ, US Army Support Command, Saigon, APO 96491 3 Sep 69

TO: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO O
APO 96384

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 4th Transportation Command (TML C) for the Period Ending 31 July is forwarded in accordance with AR 525-15.
2. Reference Section 1, page 9, paragraph (p). CONCUR.
3. Reference Section 1, page 11, paragraph (u). CONCUR.
4. Reference Section 1, page 11, paragraph (x). CONCUR.
5. Reference Section 1, page 14, paragraph lcc (6). CONCUR. Shortage of commissioned personnel remains a critical problem without relief in sight. 1st Logistical Command has been advised of the requirement for a Major and a Captain, MP, for the 4th TC.
6. Reference Section 1, page 14, paragraph lcc (7). CONCUR. This appears to be an increasing problem. Numerous denials are being received by SSC office and there is no capability to fully investigate. Based on evidence uncovered in other cases the majority of the consignee claims of non receipt of cargo are administrative errors.
7. Reference Section 2, page 16, paragraph a (3). NON-CONCUR. Procedures now in effect provide that personnel report to their new unit with copies of DA Form 1315 (Reenlistment Data Card) and DA Form 2475 (Personnel Data Card). These forms contain vital information from EM's DA Form 20 which will enable the unit CO to make adjustments in assignments. The forwarding of personnel records to unit CO's would only cause them to be reported missing, misplaced, or altered.
8. Reference Section 2, page 16, paragraph a (4): CONCUR in recommendation that 4th TC be furnished a copy of portion of the AOR Report pertaining to that command. Effective 1 September, two copies of the initial AOR Report prepared by the Personnel Services Center will be forwarded to the unit commander after it has been annotated by the appropriate composite team chief. One copy can be retained at the unit level and a second copy can be used for further annotation by the unit commander and returned to the Personnel Services Center. By providing this initial AOR Roster, the personnel of a unit will be able to see when they are reported for assignment.

AVCA SGN GO S (10 Aug 69) 1st Ind 3 Sep 69


SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 4th Transportation Command (TML C)
for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

9. The format for the 4th Transportation Command (TML C) Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Period Ending 31 July 1969 is incorrect. The proper format is as given in Appendix I, USARV REG 525-15. The 4th Transportation Command (TML C) has been advised accordingly.

10. Lessons Learned, observations and recommendations are concurred in by this command, with the exceptions above. A copy of this indorsement has been provided the originating headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LB 2604


MICHAEL D. HUSTON
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

AVCA GO-MH (10 Aug 69) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 4th Transportation Command for Period Ending 31 July 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 (U)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384 1 6 OCT 1969

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,
APO 96375

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, 4th Transportation Command for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference Section 1, page 14, paragraph 1cc (6). The status of MP officers authorized vs assigned within the Saigon Support Command is not considered critical. However, the requirement to staff positions which are recognized and pending approval of MTOE/MTDA does in fact create a problem. The Saigon Support Command has an authorization for 11 MP officers, with an additional 3 recognized positions pending approval of MTOE/MTDA, for a total of 14. As of 31 July 1969 there were 9 MP officers assigned to the Saigon Support Command. The status of MP officers in the Saigon Support Command compares favorably with similar type organizations in this command.

b. Reference item concerning shortage of security guard personnel, page 16, paragraph 2a(2). Concur. Failure to maintain the enlisted strength level of the 18th MP Brigade has lessened its ability to provide direct support for the physical security of critical and key installations of this command. These shortages have necessitated diverting skilled technicians from their primary functions in order to perform security duties. Indications are that the manpower position of the 18th MP Brigade will be reduced even lower; thus, physical security will become an even larger command problem in the future.

c. Reference item concerning an overobligated marine maintenance Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA), page 20, paragraph (3). Nonconcur. When proper procedures are followed, a correct ledger can be maintained by an ordering officer whether he is a member of the requiring activity or not.

AVCA GO-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 4th Transportation
Command for Period Ending 31 July 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 (U)

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by this and previous indorse-
ment.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4839

Stafford
D. STAFFORD

1Lt, AGC

Asst Adjutant General

CF:

USASUPCOM SGN

4th Trans Comd

AVHGC-DST (31 July 1969) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 4th Transportation Command for
Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 9637522 OCT 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, 4th
Transportation Command (TEL C) and concurs with the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


B. A. GOODWIN

MAJ, AIC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
4th Trans Comd
1st Log Comd

GPOP-DT (Undtd) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 4th Transportation Command
for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 28 OCT 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department
of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

20 Incl
nc



C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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% 100,000 Pers Assigned % 100,000 Court-Martials % 100,000 Article 15's						11th Bn
		(11.7)	(22.2)			
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		(16.2)				
		(18.2)				TOTAL

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